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Who Cares for the Poor 
in Europe?
Micro and Macro Determinants for 
Alleviating Poverty in 15 European Countries
Peer Scheepers and Manfred Te Grotenhuis
The present study aims to answer research questions on people’s willingness to donate 
money to help alleviate poverty. First, what are the individual (or micro) determinants and 
state-level (macro) determinants of welfare states that influence people’s willingness to 
donate money to the poor? Second, to what extent do individual determinants for donat-
ing money to the poor interact with state-level determinants? To answer these two ques-
tions, the 1993 Eurobarometer survey is used, containing relevant data on nearly 14,000 
inhabitants from 15 European countries. Hypotheses are tested using logistic multi-level 
analyses. The results show that religion, economic situation, political stances and types of 
welfare regimes influence people’s willingness to help the poor. Interestingly, education 
and living conditions interact with types of welfare regimes.
Poverty in Europe: 
Introduction and Questions
In 1984, the Council of the European Community pro-
posed a multidimensional definition of poverty, refer-
ring to severe restrictions on material, cultural and
social resources that exclude people from minimal par-
ticipation in European societies. In research, however,
a working definition has often been applied that
includes only the material dimension: those who are
below a line of relative poverty are considered to be
poor. Mikulic (1996) shows that poverty is unequally
distributed across European countries.1 The extent to
which poor people are supported by the state they live
in may differ across these European countries as social
security arrangements and expenditures differ strongly
across countries that have been shown to belong to dif-
ferent welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990,
1999). Moreover, the amount of money donated volun-
tarily by individuals to alleviate poverty may also
depend on the country they live in (Social and Cultural
Planning Office, 2000). Although many authors sug-
gest that living in different welfare regimes may have
quite different consequences for individual citizens,
most studies mainly focus on attitudes related to wel-
fare state policies (Gundelach, 1994; Svallfors, 1997;
Bonoli, 2000; Fridberg and Ploug, 2000; Gelissen, 2000;
Gevers et al., 2000). We, instead, will focus on the will-
ingness to donate money to the poor, directly or indi-
rectly, in order to alleviate poverty, implying some
degree of solidarity with poor people who might feel
socially excluded. Historically, this type of behaviour
has been and continues to be in contemporary societies
a rather central issue in welfare state policies. As yet,
previous European research has not shed any light on
whether individual characteristics (such as level of education
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and gender) and typical welfare state arrangements
affect people’s willingness to donate money to the
poor. Consequently, we also do not know whether
these welfare state arrangements interact with individ-
ual characteristics. Therefore we set out to answer the
following questions:
What are the individual (or micro) determinants and
state-level (macro) determinants that influence people’s
monetary donations to the poor?
To what extent do individual determinants for donat-
ing money to the poor interact with state-level determi-
nants?
Theories and Hypotheses 
on Determinants for Helping 
the Poor
We start off by exploring theories from which we
derive hypotheses on individual determinants for
helping the poor, considering this type of behaviour
to be conceptually related to helping behaviour (Lee
et al., 1999; Bekkers, 2001). The basic assumption of
one set of theories is that it is particularly people who
are socially integrated within groups in which the
social norm for helping poor people is strongly preva-
lent, that will tend to donate money to the poor.
These theories therefore focus on social groups, such
as religious denominations, which are generally con-
sidered to proclaim and transfer such norms to their
members (e.g. Batson et al., 1993). Other theories
assume that, whereas the desire to donate money to
others may be equally distributed in society, the
resources to donate are unequally divided across the
system of social stratification. Therefore they focus on
(economic) resources required to donate money to
the poor (Wilson and Musick, 1997). Yet further the-
ories assume that particular personal values or prefer-
ences, or more generally prosocial motives may affect
donating money to the poor (e.g. Berking, 1999).
Since we consider these theories to be mutually com-
plementary, we will set out to derive hypotheses on
individuals’ religiosity and economic resources, as
well as on (political) motives for donating money to
the poor. Moreover, we will consider the national
contexts in which individuals donate money to the
poor. Hence, we will set out to derive hypotheses
from a theory on welfare arrangements—arrange-
ments that may interact with individual determinants
for donating money to the poor.
Individuals’ Religion: Denomination and 
Church Attendance
Many, if not all, of the world religions explicitly teach
their followers to have compassion for the poor in gen-
eral (Batson et al., 1993). Instead of focusing on the time
or money spent on one’s own religious organizations
(Davidson and Pyle, 1994; Hoge and Yang, 1994), we
focus on people donating money to alleviate poverty in
general. Elaboration of distinctions between denomina-
tions to the extent that they donate money to alleviate
poverty reveals contradictory theoretical considerations
and inconsistent empirical patterns, at least in research
using U.S. samples. Some researchers found that Protes-
tants were less generous than Catholics and non-mem-
bers (Will and Cochran, 1995), whereas others found
exactly the opposite pattern (Hodgkinson and Weitz-
man, 1992). In any case, it seems worth investigating
whether there are differences between denominations in
Europe with regard to the amount of money spent to
alleviate poverty. We will elaborate on these differences
and formulate hypotheses to be tested.
From Durkheim’s classic work on suicide (1897/
1966), a general proposition can be derived: the more
strongly people are integrated within a social group, e.g.
the Church, the more strongly they will comply with the
norms of that social group (Stark, 1994). Since caring for
the poor is quite generally a social norm advocated by
religious denominations, we hypothesize that people
belonging to a denomination are more likely to donate
money to the poor than non-members (hypothesis 1a).
Bekkers (2003) recently suggested more specific propo-
sitions. He states that it is particularly people belonging
to rather small denominations that may be more
inclined to take this social norm more seriously, due to
small-scale social control. Hence, we hypothesize
(hypothesis 1b) that people belonging to minor denomi-
nations, such as non-Christian denominations that are
religious minorities all over Europe, are more likely to
donate money to the poor, even more so than people
belonging to major denominations.
However, the mere membership of a certain denomi-
nation tells us little about the exposure to or compliance
with the norm of that denomination. Church attend-
ance, on the other hand, does to some extent: the more
frequently people attend church, the more they are
exposed to the social norm for caring for the poor. Con-
sequently, using Durkheim’s general proposition on
integration, we hypothesize that the more frequently
people attend church, the more they will be inclined to
donate money to the poor frequently (hypothesis 2).
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Individuals’ Socio-Economic Situation: 
Education, Social Class, Income, and Living 
Conditions
Historical analyses of European initiatives to help the
poor show that throughout history, fighting poverty
has generally been considered a Christian duty, being
one primarily fulfilled by privileged citizens. These cit-
izens could afford charitable gifts to the poor, not only
out of Christian altruism, but also out of collective
self-defence to prevent the poor from rebellion and
crime (De Swaan, 1988). In contemporary societies,
we also expect the more privileged people to spend
more money to alleviate poverty than the less privi-
leged. There does exist some evidence that supports
this hypothesis (Regnerus et al., 1998). To indicate
one’s economic (privileged) situation we use income,
level of education, social class and present living con-
ditions. This results in the following hypotheses to be
tested: the higher people’s level of education (hypoth-
esis 3), the higher people’s social class (hypothesis 4),
the higher people’s income (hypothesis 5), and the
better people’s present living conditions (hypothesis
6), the more frequently they donate money to alleviate
poverty.
Political Ideologies as Individual 
Determinants: Left/Right Placement and 
Post-Materialism
Donating money to alleviate poverty may also be
related to political stances and may help to explain why
the individual determinants mentioned above are
related to caring for the poor. Traditionally, left-wing
parties have often taken the lead in proposing social
change towards greater equality and reduction of pov-
erty, whereas right-wing parties have been and are
known to emphasize one’s individual responsibility to
overcome poverty and hence have often refrained from
policies to fight it (NieuwBeerta, 1995). Accordingly,
we hypothesize that those who consider themselves to
be left-wing in political respect, tend to donate money
to alleviate poverty more frequently than those who
consider themselves to be right-wing (hypothesis 7).
From Inglehart’s (1977) general notions about the
social characteristics of people who are defined as
being ‘post-materialists’ (i.e. stress goals in life such as
freedom of speech) and those being defined as ‘materi-
alists’ (emphasize economic stability), we expect the
former to donate money to alleviate poverty more fre-
quently than the latter (hypothesis 8).
Individuals’ Background: Age and 
Gender
Schuyt (2003) suggests that older people and women are
more compassionate towards their fellow citizens.
Therefore we take these characteristics into account as
control variables, which may relate to religion, economy,
and political stances, on the one hand, and donating
money to alleviate poverty, on the other. We expect the
relation between age and donating money to alleviate
poverty to be positive: the older people are, the more fre-
quently they will donate money to alleviate poverty. On
the basis of the traditional notion that, on average,
women are more inclined to care for others, we expect
women to donate money more frequently than men.
State-Level Determinants: Types of 
Welfare Regimes
Not only individual, but also state-level determinants
may explain individuals’ behaviour towards poverty.
According to Esping-Andersen’s theory on the develop-
ment of states ‘…in the Middle Ages, it was…the family,
the church, or the lord that decided a person’s capacity
for survival’ (1990: 35). Besides social control and
oppression, these institutions provided individuals with
‘pre-commodified’ social protection. This protection
gradually decreased with the rise of capitalism in which
labour power became a commodity. This process
decreased individuals’ dependence on the old institu-
tions and increased freedom of choice, although it was
restricted by new dependencies: ‘a freedom behind new
prison walls’ as Esping-Andersen puts it (1990: 37).
Born out of necessity, however, a historical process of
de-commodification occurred in which individuals’
independence increased once again. According to Esp-
ing-Andersen, even today, individuals from various
European countries differ strongly in terms of ‘de-com-
modification’, i.e. the freedom and increasing opportu-
nities to opt out of work and still uphold acceptable
standards of living. In case de-commodification is high,
market dependency is low, due to state-level arrange-
ments that prevent people suffering from poverty in the
case of unemployment or retirement. Esping-Andersen
classifies welfare states into distinct types of regimes
according to their level of de-commodification.
The social-democratic regime (typically: the Nordic
countries) has a relatively high level of de-commodifica-
tion as social security benefits are at a high level com-
pared to other regimes. In these states, social policy
developed by the state strives to weaken the influence of
456 SCHEEPERS AND TE GROTENHUIS
the market on distribution. Its ideal is to maximize
capacities for individual independence to overcome
poverty by granting transfers directly to the helpless
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 28) and to minimize or abolish
market dependency (Esping-Andersen 1999: 78–79;
Andress and Heien, 2001: 342). Daly and Lewis (2000)
state that there is indeed a strong tendency in the Scan-
dinavian countries to collectivize caring. Consequently,
we expect that living in such a regime reduces citizens’
inclination to donate money to alleviate poverty, as this
task may be perceived to be taken care of by the welfare
state. In a similar vein, the Dutch Scientific Council for
Governmental Policies (W.R.R., 1999: 73) states that
such state policies have substituted or even oppressed
former informal help to the effect that informal solidar-
ity has decreased.
The conservative-corporatist regime (typically: France
and the former West Germany) has been shaped by the
Church with a strong emphasis on traditions—such as
those of the family—and pre-existing class and status
structures. This type of regime is only likely to interfere
in individuals’ lives if their families’ resources to pro-
vide help have been exhausted: only then does it pro-
vide social security benefits on the basis of previous
earnings and status. This eventually implies that the
family is the dominant locus of solidarity (Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 85). The state’s role is restricted to
subsidiarity, and the level of de-commodification is
intermediate (Andress and Heien, 2001: 342). From
this characterization, we infer that this type of regime
produces more inclination to donate money to allevi-
ate poverty than the social-democratic regime. How-
ever, given the crucial position of the family, solidarity
with the poor may be restricted to people’s primary
group, implying that people will not donate much
money to reduce poverty in general.
The liberal regime (typically: the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries) is characterized by an even lower level of de-com-
modification. Here, the market is considered to be the
main arena for the distribution of resources, and social
security benefits are modest and social rights generally
rather poor. This type of regime produces a high degree
of independence from the state and, as a consequence,
offers individuals less help to fight social catastrophes
such as poverty (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 61–63). From
these characteristics, we infer that this type of regime
produces strong social networks of family and friends,
possibly necessary to provide the means to participate in
society, and if necessary, reduce poverty. Therefore we
expect that living in this regime will affect the inclination
to donate money to alleviate poverty positively.
However, there is another type of regime that may
produce even more willingness to alleviate poverty.
Some authors (e.g. Leibfriend, 1992; Ferrera, 1996;
Bonoli, 1997) argued for the Mediterranean countries
(typically: Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) to be consid-
ered as a separate regime: the Latin Rim. In this type of
regime, instead of an official level of social security, an
underdeveloped system of social security exists. In the
Latin Rim the percentage of old people receiving home-
help services is low, whereas the percentage of old people
living with their children is extremely high (Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 61–63). From this characterization, we
infer that living in this type of regime makes people
aware of the fact that poverty is not so much a state’s
issue and hence may force people to lend a helping hand
in instances of poverty. Therefore we expect this type of
regime to produce the highest level of donating money
to alleviate poverty. Consequently, we hypothesize that
the people’s willingness to alleviate poverty is rank-
ordered: the lowest willingness is to be found in social-
democratic states, a higher willingness in conservative-
corporatist states, an even higher willingness in liberal
states, and the highest willingness in Latin Rim states
(hypothesis 9).
However, quite a different rank-order may be
developed by authors who propose that there may be
communicating vessels between formal and informal
types of solidarity. If one considers social-democratic
welfare regimes to stand out in developing policies that
foster formal as well as informal types of solidarity
(Komter et al., 1999; W.R.R., 1999), then people living
in regimes with the highest level of de-commodification
(i.e. social-democratic states) are the most likely to
donate money to alleviate poverty, followed by conser-
vative-corporatist states, whereas liberal states and states
belonging to the Latin Rim may be considered to be
states that harbour people with the lowest inclination to
donate money to alleviate poverty (hypothesis 10).
Individual Determinants Affected by 
State-Level Determinants: Cross-Level 
Interactions
All the above-mentioned hypotheses imply that there is
no interaction between individual determinants and
types of regimes. We hypothesize generally that religious
people are more likely to donate money to alleviate pov-
erty than non-members (hypotheses 1 and 2). This is
implicitly said to be true for every type of welfare state.
Clearly, this is a rather strong assumption and could be
questioned on several grounds. For instance, if a state’s
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commitment to preventing poverty is low (e.g. in the
Latin Rim), religious people may indeed be more
strongly inclined to donate money to alleviate poverty
than non-members since there is no collective provision.
In states where the state’s commitment is high (e.g. in
social-democratic states), religious people’s incentives to
help the poor could be somewhat oppressed since there
is a collective provision. Hence, we expect that the effects
of religiosity vary across welfare states: the effect may be
stronger in Latin Rim states than in social-democratic
states (hypothesis 11). Another example is the relation-
ship between people’s economic situation and their will-
ingness to donate money to the poor (hypotheses 3–6).
It seems safe to assume that people who live in bad eco-
nomic conditions will not donate much money to allevi-
ate poverty, no matter what welfare state they live in. If
people live in rather sound economic conditions, how-
ever, the type of regime will presumably make a differ-
ence. In the Latin Rim regime, for example, privileged
people’s willingness to donate money to alleviate pov-
erty may be strong in order to substitute collective
arrangements that are almost absent. In social-democratic
states, privileged people’s willingness to donate money
to the poor is presumably much less since there are col-
lective arrangements. However, privileged people in lib-
eral states may consider poverty an individual’s own
responsibility and may therefore oppose any state inter-
ference or individual acts, leading privileged individuals
to refrain from commitments to alleviate poverty, even
more strongly than in social-democratic states. Therefore
we expect the effects of economic living conditions to vary
across welfare state regimes accordingly (hypothesis 12).
Data and Measurements
To test our hypotheses, we used secondary data derived
from the Eurobarometer 40 survey (Commission of the
European Communities; Rigaux, 1994), conducted in 15
European countries in 1993. This survey was especially
designed to describe poverty in Europe and includes
valid and reliable data on several dimensions of depriva-
tion and social exclusion as well as on important indi-
vidual characteristics such as income and religion. The
samples constituting the Eurobarometer 40 were drawn
according to a multi-stage random design. First, admin-
istrative regions were drawn proportional to population
size. Second, a cluster of random starting addresses was
drawn from within these regions. Subsequently, further
addresses were selected by a random route procedure.
Finally, at each address the respondent was selected
randomly. For more detailed information on the Euro-
barometer sampling strategy and survey design, see:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo.
Dependent Variable: Donating Money 
to Alleviate Poverty
To measure people’s willingness to alleviate poverty we
use a straightforward question from the survey: ‘In the
last twelve months have you given money directly or
indirectly to help the people who are living in poverty or
are socially excluded?’. Possible answers were: never, sel-
dom, sometimes, and regularly. Because of the ordinal
character of the measurement, we decided to collapse
the four categories into a dichotomy: never/seldom and
sometimes/regularly.2
Independent Individual Variables
Individuals’ religiosity was measured using questions on
denomination and church attendance. We distinguished
between four denominations: Protestant, Catholic, other
non-Christian (such as Jewish, Muslim and Hindu) and
the non-religious. Church attendance was measured
on a 5-point scale ranging from never to several times a
week.
Individuals’ economic situations were measured using
questions on education, social class, present living con-
ditions and income. To measure the level of education,
Eurobarometer surveys use the age at which people
completed their full-time education (range 6–28).
Respondents’ social class was measured using an index
that closely resembles the widely used EGP categoriza-
tion. We distinguished between higher professionals,
lower professionals, non-manual workers, self-
employed, and manual workers. Moreover, we added
presently non-employed categories such as unemployed,
retired, housewives and students. To measure the
present living conditions, we constructed a Likert-scale
consisting of 11 items directly measuring aspects of pov-
erty such as quality of housing, living, health, and leisure
time. The scale turned out to be highly reliable (Cron-
bach’s alpha 0.86). Income was measured objectively by
referring to the total amount of money available on a
monthly basis (i.e. from all household members, includ-
ing wages, salaries, and rents) and was standardized for
reasons of comparability.3
To test whether political stances influence people’s
willingness to alleviate poverty, we used a standard 4-
item measurement of post-materialism and a standard
10-point scale to indicate left-wing/right-wing position.
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Independent Contextual Variables: 
Welfare States
At the contextual level, we made distinctions between
welfare states. Arts and Gelissen (1999) have shown a
remarkable consistency in classifying countries since the
founding work of Esping-Andersen. Reviewing the state
of the art, they ascertained that all authors agree that
Great Britain and Ireland belong to the liberal-leaning
type of regime. Furthermore, all authors agree that the
Nordic countries belong to the social-democratic regime
category, including Denmark. On the basis of 58 charac-
teristics collected in 11 welfare states, Wildeboer Schut
et al. (2000) show that there are ample empirical reasons
to include the Netherlands in this category too. There
have also been some disputes over the countries that
belong to the conservative-corporatist states. Again,
Wildeboer Schut et al. (2000) show convincingly that
Belgium, France and West Germany belong to this cate-
gory. We decided to add Luxembourg to this category,
because it is in the geographical and economical prox-
imity of these three countries. Since Leibfriend’s study
(1992), most authors agree that Spain, Italy, Portugal
and Greece belong to the Latin Rim states. This left us
with East Germany as a special case, often ignored in
previous studies. We assumed that this country
belonged to the social-democratic camp, since the
people included in the samples have been exposed to the
socialist regime of the German Democratic Republic for
most of their lives. To test this assumption, we treated
this country as a separate (dummy) variable.
Analyses
As our hypotheses and our data are hierarchically struc-
tured, i.e. individuals living in different countries, and as
our dependent variable is treated as dichotomous, we
use logistic multi-level regression analyses (Bryk and
Raudenbusch, 1992; Kreft and De Leeuw, 1998; Snijders
and Bosker, 1999). In a first analysis we estimated the
amount of variance at the individual level and at the
country level. At both levels the variance was significant
which implies that multi-level analysis is appropriate. In
a second step, we analysed the impact of each independ-
ent variable separately in a set of simple regression anal-
yses with random intercepts, to take into account the
differences between countries. In a third step we
explored the variation in the effects found in step 2 by
adding random slopes to the model to test whether they
reached significance. Then, we estimated parameters
with a multiple multi-level regression model, presented
in the second column of Table 1 with standard errors in
the third column. In a further step we examined whether
the random slopes that we found to be significant related
systematically to the types of welfare states. In a final
step we included all individual and state-level character-
istics together with the significant cross-level interac-
tions found in the previous steps in a second multiple
multi-level model, presented in the fourth and fifth col-
umns of Table 1.
Results
Variance between Individuals and 
Countries
We found a significant amount of variance at both lev-
els, meaning that the frequencies of donating money to
alleviate poverty differ between individuals and between
countries. To illustrate the latter, we estimated for each
country the proportion of citizens that donate money to
alleviate poverty sometimes or regularly (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 shows considerable variance between coun-
tries.4 Interestingly, the countries that are labelled as lib-
eral countries (i.e. Great Britain, Ireland and Northern
Ireland) seem to have the largest proportion of citizens
that regularly donate money, whereas the conservative-
corporatist states (France, Belgium, Luxembourg and
the former West Germany) have the lowest proportions.
In between these two extremes of liberal versus conser-
vative-corporatist states, we find Latin Rim states, such
as Spain and Italy, and social-democratic states such as
Norway and Denmark. East Germany seems to be closer
to the conservative-corporatist states than to the social-
democratic states. This rank order does not lend much
support to either of the rank orders hypothesized. How-
ever, Figure 1 does not tell the whole story as composi-
tional effects, such as that of religiosity, have not been
taken into account. Therefore, in the next section, we
will estimate parameters for all types of regimes, also
taking individual differences into account.
Multiple Multi-Level Regression Analyses 
with Random Intercepts
Because many of the individual determinants (denomi-
nation, church attendance) are related, we performed a
multiple regression analysis to put our hypotheses to a
rigorous test. First, we assumed that there is no interac-
tion between individual determinants and types of
regimes. Subsequently, we added significant interactions
to the model.
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Table 1 Parameter estimates (logit coefficients) from multiple multi-level logistic regression analysis, random intercept 
model and interaction model (n1 = 13,775, n2 = 15)
Independent variables Money donated to alleviate poverty
Fixed effects1 Interactions
Estimate Standard error Estimate Standard error
Denomination
Non-members (base-level) 0.000 0.000
Protestant -0.010 0.080 ns -0.002 0.080 ns
Catholic -0.128 0.081 ns -0.110 0.081 ns
Non-Christian (see note 5) 0.470 0.123 0.445 0.123
Church attendance
Several times a week (base-level) 0.000 0.000
Once a week -0.578 0.120 -0.573 0.120
A few times a year -0.903 0.118 -0.883 0.118
Once a year or less -1.296 0.124 -1.272 0.124
Never -1.471 0.129 -1.446 0.129
Educational attainment 0.045 0.005
Educational attainment
Liberal type (base level)2 0.095 0.024
Social democratic type -0.058 0.027
Conservative-corporatist type -0.040 0.027 ns
Latin rim type -0.064 0.026
Former East Germany -0.009 0.033 ns
Social class
Higher professionals (base-level) 0.000 0.000
Lower professionals -0.269 0.117 -0.262 0.117
Non-manual -0.379 0.105 -0.363 0.105
Self-employed -0.180 0.119 ns -0.183 0.119 ns
Manual work -0.377 0.109 -0.354 0.109
Retired -0.554 0.114 -0.515 0.114
Unemployed -0.610 0.119 -0.572 0.119
Housewife -0.485 0.114 -0.461 0.114
Student -0.721 0.117 -0.690 0.118
Income 0.186 0.021 0.184 0.021
Gave valid answer (base level) 0.000 0.000
Refused to give answer -0.115 0.053 -0.122 0.053
Did not know -0.117 0.068 -0.133 0.068
Living conditions (no interaction) -0.284 0.045
Living conditions
Liberal type (base level)2 -0.600 0.192
Social-democratic type 0.223 0.260 ns
Conservative-corporatist type 0.445 0.245
Latin rim type 0.391 0.240 ns
Former East Germany 0.491 0.355 ns
Age 0.015 0.002 0.015 0.002
Gender
Woman (base-level) 0.000 0.000
Man -0.184 0.040 -0.178 0.040
Left-right placement -0.046 0.010 -0.045 0.010
Gave valid answer (base level) 0.000 0.000
Refused to give answer -0.107 0.073 ns -0.111 0.073 ns
Did not know -0.287 0.066 -0.274 0.065
continued
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Religion
According to Table 1, the differences between Protestants,
Catholics and non-members turn out to be non-signific-
ant in this model: this refutes hypothesis 1a. This is
mainly due to the inclusion of church attendance. Table 1
shows that people who attend church several times a week
are most likely to donate money to alleviate poverty, and
this likelihood decreases as attendance is less frequent,
which corroborates hypothesis 2. These findings imply
that it is not so much denominational membership that
determines the help provided to the poor, but rather
church attendance, which we consider to be a more valid
indicator of exposure to religious norms advocated by
church leaders. However, this line of reasoning does not
apply to members of non-Christian denominations: we
find that people belonging to this religious category
Table 1 (continued)
1Fixed effects and random intercept.
2Effect in liberal type, all other parameters are deviations from effect in liberal type.
3Effects within average educational attainment and average living conditions.
ns = non-significant (α = 5 per cent, one-tailed) deviation from base-level.
(Post)-materialism
Post-materialist 0.000 0.000
Mixed type -0.111 0.062 -0.105 0.062
Materialist -0.210 0.068 -0.199 0.068
Types of regimes3
Liberal type (base-level) 0.000 0.000
Social-democratic type -0.849 0.172 -0.925 0.174
Conservative-corporatist type -1.258 0.161 -1.290 0.162
Latin rim type -0.857 0.161 -1.004 0.162
Former East Germany -1.472 0.238 -1.657 0.242
Intercept 2.060 0.273 2.382 0.231
Figure 1 Estimated average proportion of citizens that sometimes or regularly spend money to alleviate poverty in 15 Euro-
pean countries
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donate money more frequently than non-members,
which is in accordance with hypothesis 1b. 5
Economic Situation
Next, we found that level of education has a positive and
significant effect, which is in accordance with hypothesis 3,
even after controlling for income, social class and living
conditions. This might be due to the educational content
itself if one supposes that here norms are taught similarly to
those in churches. Social class differences are significant. All
class categories donate less frequently than higher profes-
sionals which supports hypothesis 4. Self-employed people
do not differ significantly from higher professionals,
whereas most of the other class categories do. Students,
unemployed people and retired people stand out because
they donate least frequently compared to the higher profes-
sionals. Income has a positive effect on donating money to
alleviate poverty, which supports hypothesis 5. It is interest-
ing to note that our analyses show that people who refused
to tell (or did not know) their income, appear to donate
money to alleviate poverty less frequently, compared to
those who gave a valid answer. This may indicate that these
categories have in fact a low income. The effect of living
conditions implies that those in more privileged positions
donate more frequently, which supports hypothesis 6. The
effects of age and gender are significant: older people are
more likely to donate money to the poor, compared to
younger people, and men are less likely to donate money to
the poor, compared to women.
Political Stances
In line with hypothesis 7, we found that people who said
they belong to the left, turn out to donate money to
alleviate poverty more frequently than people consider-
ing themselves to belong to the right wing of the political
spectrum. People who did not know their political
orientation were found to donate money to alleviate
poverty significantly less frequently. Materialists and
mixed types are less likely to donate money to alleviate
poverty compared to post-materialists, which supports
hypothesis 8.
Welfare States
With regard to donating money to the poor, all parame-
ters in Table 1 deviate significantly and negatively from
the liberal countries. This implies that people within the
liberal states donate money to the poor more frequently
than people in any other regime. The people living in
conservative-corporatist states are the least likely to
donate money to the poor. The former East Germany
takes a position that is similar to the latter states:
these people are the least likely to donate money to
alleviate poverty than people in any other regime. The
scores of people living in social-democratic states and
in the Latin Rim are close to each other and in
between the two other types of regimes, i.e. in
between liberal and conservative-corporatist states.
All in all, we (again) found no conclusive support for
hypotheses 9 and 10.
Multiple Multi-Level Regression Analyses 
with Random Intercepts and Interactions
To determine which interactions should be included in
the multiple model, we first added random slopes to a
set of simple regression analyses in order to explore
whether there was any significant between-country vari-
ation. If so, we subsequently included interaction terms
between individual determinants and the types of
regimes in order to explain this observed variance. It
turned out that this between-country variation reached
significance in two cases: level of education and living
conditions. In all other cases the variation was small and
non-significant. This finding actually implies that we
have to refute hypothesis 11 on the differential effects of
religiosity. To test whether the effects of level of educa-
tion and living conditions vary systematically, as we pro-
posed in hypothesis 12, we explored interactions with
types of regimes in the multiple model (see Table 1,
fourth and fifth columns). As all other effects remained
virtually the same, we will focus on these two variables.
The general positive effect of level of education, as previ-
ously described, varies across welfare type states. The
strongest effect was found in liberal welfare states
(0.095) and former East Germany (0.095 – 0.009 =
.086). In the other types of regimes, especially the social-
democratic states and the Latin Rim states, the effect is
much lower (0.095 – 0.064 = 0.031). The other signific-
ant cross-level interaction refers to living conditions. In
general we found that the worse people’s living condi-
tions were, the less people were inclined to donate
money to alleviate poverty. Again, the strongest negative
effect was found within the liberal states, whereas the
effect in the other regimes was smaller, although only
significantly so within the conservative-corporatist
regime.
The interaction parameters of level of education and
living conditions indicate that their effects are different
across welfare regimes. To illustrate these two significant
interactions, we depict the regression slopes of level of
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education and living conditions for different welfare
regimes in Figure 2.
As Figure 2 shows, the regression slopes of level of
education are quite different. This means that the pos-
itive effect of level of education as described above var-
ies across welfare state regimes. The strongest effect
(i.e. the steepest slope) of level of education could be
found within the liberal type and in the former East
Germany. Within the other types of regimes, the slopes
are less steep, which means that the effects are less
strong. As a consequence, we see much more variation
in donating money to alleviate poverty among the
lower educated, whereas among the highest educated
the differences are restricted to a dichotomy: liberal
versus other types of regimes. This means that, among
the lower educated, it indeed matters in which type of
regime they live. The lower educated in the Latin Rim,
for instance, are more likely to donate money to the
poor than the lower educated in conservative-corporatist
states. This difference between these two types of
regimes gradually disappears altogether among the
highest educated. In other words, there is no constant
rank order of types of regimes across different levels of
education.
The effect of living conditions also interacts with wel-
fare state regimes. Where the living conditions are above
average, the tendency to donate money to alleviate poverty
is rather high and varies across types of regimes, where
the privileged people in liberal states stand out. Among
people living under bad conditions, the willingness to
donate money is less, as one might expect, and it hardly
depends on the type of regime they live in. Again, as a
consequence of this interaction, the rank order between
welfare states is not constant and depends on living con-
ditions. Clearly these findings refute hypotheses 9 and 10
once more.
Conclusions and Discussion
The questions we addressed relate to the impact of both
individual and state-level determinants on caring for the
poor in Europe, using a straightforward indicator to
measure people’s willingness to donate money to poor
people. Moreover, we focused on the interaction
between individual and state-level determinants.
Our first question referred to individual and state-
level characteristics of people helping the poor. We
found that, after taking into account the fact that
denominations have different church attendance rates,
people belonging to Protestant and Catholic denomina-
tions do not differ significantly from non-members.
Hence, it is not so much membership of denominations
as such that determines donating money to the poor, but
rather church attendance: the more people attend
church, the more likely they are to help the poor, which
supports our second hypothesis. People belonging to
non-Christian denominations, however, stand out: these
people were found to donate money to alleviate poverty
more frequently than any other category related to relig-
iosity. The refutation of hypothesis 1a on differences
between denominations and the corroboration of
hypothesis 2 on church attendance is rather consistent
with findings from the U.S. (Hodgkinson and Weitzman,
1994; Will and Cochran, 1995; Regnerus et al., 1998) and
supports the general proposition in Durkheim’s theory
on integration. The finding that non-Christian religious
people donate more frequently is rather new and quite
understandable from the perspective of integration the-
ory, as suggested by Bekkers (2003).
We also found support for our hypotheses about the
impact of people’s economic situation (hypotheses 3–6):
especially highly educated people, people belonging to
the high professionals, people with higher incomes and
Figure 2 Estimated effects of education and living conditions within five types of welfare regimes
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people in good living conditions are more likely to donate
money to alleviate poverty. These findings are consistent
with previous historical analyses (De Swaan, 1988) show-
ing that the privileged cared for the poor to some extent,
not because of altruistic reasons but out of self-defence.
However, in contemporary societies, the risk that the rela-
tively poor masses will overthrow the more privileged has
certainly been reduced. So we do not really know what
motivates the privileged to donate money to alleviate pov-
erty. Furthermore, we found that subscribing to left-wing
and post-materialist ideas is also positively related to
donating money to the poor. These political stances, how-
ever, could not account for the relationships between
religiosity and economical situation, on the one hand, and
the willingness to donate money to the poor, on the other.
With regard to state-level characteristics, we found
significant differences between the types of welfare states
in relation to donating money, focusing on the average
citizen in terms of economic situation. However, the
rank order did not match any of the two contradictory
hypotheses on differences between welfare state regimes.
We found that liberal states, where the state is reluctant
to fight poverty, produce the highest amount of solidar-
ity with the poor. Previously, Gelissen (2000) also found
that the liberal states produce the highest commitment
to welfare state provisions, with all other regimes lagging
behind. Hence, we may conclude that these liberal states
with their lack of collective provisions regarding formal
solidarity produce informal substitutes for solidarity
with the poor. However, this does not hold for the Latin
Rim states, which are similarly reluctant to alleviate pov-
erty. The latter states turned out to produce significantly
less solidarity with the poor, actually similar to the
extent to which social-democratic states produce solid-
arity. Conservative-corporatist states turned out to pro-
duce even less solidarity with the poor. The latter finding
may be interpreted within the framework of Esping-
Andersen’s theory, if one emphasizes the predominant
ideology of familialism in this regime: familialism
implies solidarity with the inner family circle and,
apparently, does not necessarily imply solidarity with
people outside of this inner circle. Previously, we found
evidence to support this part of the theory (Scheepers
et al., 2002). There we found that particularly the Latin
Rim regime produces solidarity with family and friends,
closely followed by the conservative-corporatist states,
whereas in other regimes social contacts were less wide-
spread. These findings imply that in conservative-corpo-
ratist as well as Latin Rim states, where state policies
have not been developed for formal solidarity, social net-
works of family and friends remain the main structure for
informal solidarity. The finding that states with a high
level of collective provisions, such as social-democratic
states, produce a similar low level of informal solidarity
with the poor as Latin Rim states may be considered
odd. In states belonging to the Latin Rim with low levels
of collective provisions, people tend to care for their
family and friends and much less so for their fellow citi-
zens in poverty, supposing they cannot help everyone. In
states belonging to the social-democratic type, people
are reluctant to help their fellow citizens in poverty
because they suppose that the state will take care of
them. Moreover, other evidence tells us that social con-
tacts in social-democratic regimes are relatively scarce
compared to other regimes (Scheepers et al., 2002). This
joint evidence supports theories stating that social pol-
icies in social-democratic states aimed at formal solidar-
ity may have actually substituted or even oppressed
informal solidarity (e.g. W.R.R., 1999).
Our second question related to differential effects of
individual characteristics across countries, i.e. welfare
state regimes. We found few, but quite interesting differ-
ential effects, related to the frequency of donating money
to the poor. Highly educated people and people in sound
living conditions, particularly those living in liberal states,
stand out in donating money to the poor. Apparently,
privileged people living in liberal states, where the state is
reluctant to care for the poor, consider it an obligation to
help them. In the face of poverty, these privileged people
are likely to donate money to alleviate poverty, in the
absence of collective provisions. Middendorp (1978)
showed that there is quite some history to this kind of
behaviour, particularly in countries with liberal traditions.
He showed that, by the mid-nineteenth century, many
liberals (as well as conservatives, for that matter) had
become aware—predominantly through Marxist atten-
tion for the disrupting effects of the industrialization pro-
cess—of the inevitable poverty of many people who could
not free themselves from their situation. These liberals
therefore tried to soften these disrupting effects of indus-
trialization by lending support to the poor. Apparently,
this tradition has survived over the years. Vice versa, priv-
ileged people living in other regimes are quite similar in
their willingness to donate money to the poor. This seems
to imply that welfare arrangements outside of liberal
states do not affect their behaviour in this respect: privi-
leged people donate more to poverty than less privileged
people, irrespective of the welfare state they live in. These
findings imply that, even for social-democratic regimes,
there is no evidence for communicating vessels between
the level of formal solidarity developed by state policies
and the level of informal solidarity.
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Notes
1. In the European Community Household Panel, it was
found that all over Europe particularly ‘one person’
and ‘one parent’ households run the risk of poverty,
in addition to families with five or more persons
(except for France and Denmark). Families depend-
ing on social security as their main financial source
also run a higher risk. In some European countries,
such as Belgium, Spain and Italy, people depending
on their private company’s profits run a higher risk of
suffering poverty. These families turned out to have
less durable goods due to financial problems. Most of
these poor families, except the Danish, are more likely
to live in houses that are too small, with dank walls
and rotten floors (Mikulic, 1997).
2. To check whether important information was lost as
a result of this procedure, the original four-category
variable was used as a (quasi-) interval variable in a
multilevel linear regression analysis. The results
were very similar to those reported in Table 1. On
request, the results of this additional analysis will be
sent to interested parties.
3. Income was standardized in each country separately,
with mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1.
4. Variance between the four types of welfare state
regimes is 0.052 (df = 3), the variance within all
countries amounts to 0.007 (df = 11), On the basis
of a F-test (F-value 7.77, P = 0.005) the null hypoth-
esis (both variances are equal) was rejected.
5. In the Eurobarometer survey, church attendance
within non-Christian denominations was not meas-
ured. To have a meaningful comparison, we tested
whether people belonging to non-Christian denom-
inations differ from non-members who never attend
church.
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